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Abstract
In May 1994 France distinguished itself  from other more reticent 
members of  the international community by being the first country 
to explicitly identify the events occurring in Rwanda as a ‘genocide’. 
The present article elucidates the impact of  the very particular ways 
in which key French government figures used the term ‘genocide’ 
to describe the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda both during and after the 
events of  1994. 
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“Dans ces pays-là, un génocide c’est pas trop important”
(François Mitterrand, summer 1994)
For Chantal Kalisa
(1965-2015)
6 April 1994 marked the beginning of  the groundswell of  violence 
in Rwanda that was carefully planned and orchestrated by Hutu 
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extremists and that sought to eradicate the Tutsi ethnic group (Des 
Forges, 1999, 7). However, the issue of  whether this concerted 
aggression should be formally recognised as a ‘genocide’ was a deeply 
problematic question for the international community, extending far 
beyond the simple linguistic parameters of  denotation. Both the UN 
and the USA, for example, were reticent to use this term in relation 
to Rwanda; for them, in the light of  the UN Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime of  Genocide (CPPCG), 
it carried if  not an explicit legal obligation, then at the very least an 
implicit moral imperative to intervene, which they were unwilling 
to do (Prunier, 1995, 274; Des Forges, 1999, 7). The decision to 
use or not use the term ‘genocide’ within the context of  Rwanda 
therefore carried particular significance. It was in fact France that 
was the first country to publicly describe the events unfolding in 
Rwanda as a ‘génocide’ in a press statement by the then Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppé, in May 1994. This article will seek 
to elucidate both the manner in which this term has been used by 
various members of  the French government, and the repercussions 
on the way in which the events in Rwanda were represented within 
the French-speaking community. 
Amidst the considerable body of  literature that has already 
been published on the genocide in Rwanda, several monographs have 
explored the controversial question of  the extent of  France’s direct 
involvement in the preparation, execution and immediate aftermath 
of  the genocide (see for example Saint-Exupéry, 2004; Gouteux, 
2005; Pradelle, 2005; Wallis, 2006; Morel, 2010). Of  particular note 
are accusations of  complicity by French soldiers in the killing of  
Tutsis at Bisesero (see Wallis, 2006, 146-156) and the way the French 
‘humanitarian’ mission known as Opération Turquoise, which was 
deployed from June 1994, was used to shield genocide perpetrators 
from the advancing Tutsi forces of  the Front Patriotique Rwandais 
(FPR) (Des Forges, 1999, 492). The main focus of  the existing 
research on France’s involvement has therefore been to acquire a 
deeper understanding of  the actions implemented by the French 
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authorities in Rwanda; the present article seeks to contribute a 
complementary analysis by focussing on the language used by key 
figures in the French government of  that time. This is an area that 
has so far attracted only limited critical attention (see Doridant and 
Lacoste, 2014); however, it can provide valuable insight into how 
perceptions of  the genocide can be influenced – and in some cases 
deliberately manipulated – by the language used to describe it.   
The analysis presented in this article is informed by Discourse 
Analysis, which identifies the importance of  interpreting language 
not simply in terms of  its own internal grammatical structures, but 
by also taking into account the social and cultural context in which 
it is produced (Fairclough, 2001, 2003). The discussion in this paper 
is grounded in tangible lexical and grammatical data, with the focus 
being on the use of  the key term of  ‘génocide’ and the context 
within which it was produced and disseminated. 
‘Genocide’ was a neologism coined in 1944 by the Polish 
Jewish lawyer Rafael Lemkin, who had been working since the 
1930s towards the formulation of  a law to punish those persons 
found guilty of  implementing the destruction of  a people. (King, 
2007, 29-35) In 1948 the UN adopted the Genocide Convention 
cited above, where the term is defined as those acts “committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group” (Convention, 1948, Art. 2). Thus, the actions 
constituting genocide are considered to be unidirectional: even 
if  the intended victims retaliate with significant force or success, 
if  there is not the deliberate intent to destroy on their side, their 
actions cannot be classed as ‘genocide’. ‘Genocide’ can therefore be 
clearly distinguished from other terms such as ‘conflict’, ‘combat’, 
‘(civil) war’ etc., which convey a reciprocity of  aggression between 
two opposing sides, and where the underlying intent is most often 
the desire for supremacy in some regard, rather than the desire to 
destroy. An exhaustive quantitative and qualitative study of  the use 
of  these various terms in evocations of  the genocide in Rwanda, and 
particularly their use by the French authorities, would be a valuable 
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extension of  the initial observations presented in the following 
pages, however such an ambitious undertaking is outside the scope 
of  this article.  
Before examining the specific instances of  the use of  the term 
‘génocide’ in 1994 by members of  the then French government, it is 
important to briefly evoke the broader historical context of  Franco-
Rwandese relations, where the question of  language looms large. 
France’s socio-political links with Rwanda began in the early 1960s, 
when President Charles de Gaulle agreed to provide assistance 
to the new Republic “au nom de la défense de la francophonie” 
(Mission, 1998, 31). During the 1970s and especially following the 
coup d’Etat which brought the Hutu leader Juvénal Habyarimana 
to power in Rwanda in 1973, France’s involvement in the African 
country significantly increased, particularly in the area of  military 
aid. This evolution can be seen as a logical amplification of  France’s 
earlier commitment to defend and promote la francophonie, with the 
notion of  ‘defence’ moving from the realm of  a pure concept to that 
of  actual practical support. In this connection, it is significant that 
both the French government’s own Mission d’information sur le Rwanda 
(1998) and the Rwandan government’s Rapport Mucyo (2007), each 
of  which addresses the issue of  France’s involvement in Rwanda 
before and during the genocide, describe France’s foreign policy of  
the 1970s and 1980s in a manner suggestive of  a neo-colonialist 
discourse:
 (…) la France élabore une vision géopolitique claire qui se 
fonde alors sur la conviction selon laquelle les Américains 
prennent une position importante en Afrique francophone, 
et qu’il faut consolider la francophonie pour contrecarrer 
cette influence rivale. (Rapport Mucyo, 2007, 16)  
The degree of  importance accorded to this politicolinguistic rivalry 
within the French government sphere should not be underestimated; 
as the Mission d’information mentions, the antagonism towards the 
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USA led to Rwanda being viewed as part of  a “ligne Maginot 
linguistique” (1998, 31-32). The use of  this metaphor stemming 
from the armed conflict of  the early 20th century opposing long-
term rivals France and Germany is firstly highly significant as an 
indicator of  Rwanda’s strategic importance for France. At the 
same time, through its historical connotations, it also established 
a foundation for the elaboration of  a discourse where the French 
could present themselves as being morally justified to ‘defend’ the 
French-speakers within Rwanda from the ‘assaults’, ‘incursions’ 
and ‘attacks’ mounted by English-speakers identified as enemies 
of  the incumbent Hutu regime, such as the Tutsi exiles living in 
neighbouring Uganda, who may have sought to cross this new 
Maginot line and ‘invade’ the country. (Des Forges, 1999, 48-51; 
Rwanda, 2012, 272)
Following the outbreak of  genocide on 6 April 1994, the 
French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alain Juppé was the first official 
of  any government, as mentioned above, to publicly characterise the 
events occurring in Rwanda as ‘génocide’ in a declaration to the 
press made on 15 May after a meeting in Brussels. The apparent 
absence of  any consultable recording or transcription of  his speech 
means that the most detailed information available on its contents 
appears in the summary given in the Mission d’information, where it is 
presented in the following terms: 
Sur le plan diplomatique, la France est le premier pays, le 15 
mai, à avoir qualifié le drame de génocide en même temps 
qu’elle a condamné les massacres perpétrés tant par les 
milices Interahamwe que par le FPR. (1998, 314) 
Syntactically, this sentence establishes an equation between two 
sets of  events which were separate, but which here are implicitly 
conflated; in other words, given that ‘génocide’ and ‘massacres’ are 
mentioned in the same sentence, a logical assumption would be that 
the two are related in some way. However, the term ‘génocide’ relates 
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to the campaign of  destruction perpetrated by Hutu extremists 
against the Tutsis (April –July 1994), whereas the ‘massacres’ appear 
to reference the civil war between Hutus and Tutsis that played out 
in two phases: October 1990-August 1993 and April –July 1994. 
(Prunier, 1995) The situation on the ground in Rwanda in 1994 was 
certainly complex; however, I would argue that it is significant that 
Juppé’s representation of  the events does not clearly identify the 
perpetrators and victims of  the ‘génocide’ he is so proud to have 
named; rather, the use of  the construction ‘tant…que’ grammatically 
reinforces the idea of  an equality of  responsibility between the two 
ethnic groups for the killings taking place. 
Subsequent uses of  term ‘génocide’ by Juppé reveal the same 
trend of  blurring the lines between genocide and ethnic conflict/
civil war through his lexical and syntactical choices. On 18 May 
1994, for example, a few days after his statement in Brussels, Juppé 
responded to a question in the French parliament regarding the 
situation in Rwanda in the following terms:
Destruction systématique d’un groupe ethnique, telle est la 
définition du génocide. C’est la raison pour laquelle, tout 
comme vous, monsieur Million, j’ai moi-même utilisé ce 
terme il y a quelques jours, puisque c’est bien de cela qu’il 
s’agit au Rwanda. Face à l’offensive du Front patriotique 
rwandais, les troupes gouvernementales rwandaises se sont 
livrées à une élimination systématique de la population tutsie, 
ce qui a provoqué ensuite la généralisation des massacres. La 
France a dénoncé avec la plus grande fermeté cette situation. 
(Morel, 2010, 731) 
Juppé explicitly and erroneously reframes the genocide of  the Tutsis, 
which was a programme of  destruction that had been carefully 
planned for several years, within the parameters of  a response to 
an offensive launched by the FPR, thereby effectively portraying the 
latter as instigators of  the violence suffered by their fellow Tutsis. In 
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fact, the massacres by Hutu extremists began during the night of  6 
to 7 April, and there were no attacks by the FPR immediately prior to 
this date, despite inflammatory claims to this effect by the so-called 
‘hate radio’, Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (Morel, 2010, 
668, 731; Des Forges, 1999, 130). However, even more significant is 
the continuation of  that same sentence, evoking the ‘généralisation 
des massacres’. As in the example discussed above, there is a clear 
connotative displacement from the concept of  genocide to that 
of  armed conflict, and moreover a conflict where the distinction 
between aggressor and victim appears to have been consciously 
blurred. 
The fact that this tendency towards obfuscation was shared 
by other members of  the French government, rather than being 
simply attributable to the personal rhetoric of  Alain Juppé, can be 
seen from the contents of  a radio interview given a few days later 
on 24 May 1994 by junior Health Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy, 
who was on a humanitarian mission in the Great Lakes region of  
East Africa: 
Douste-Blazy : Nous sommes devant le plus grand massacre 
de la fin du vingtième siècle. Il y a entre 200 000 et 500 000 
morts, 2 millions de réfugiés et des centaines de gens qui 
passent tous les jours la frontière… C’est terrible. C’est un 
vrai génocide. On a tué délibérément, non seulement les 
adultes, mais aussi les enfants, y compris les nourrissons… 
[…]
Info-Matin : Vous avez parlé de génocide. S’agit-il du 
génocide des Tutsis par les Hutus ou bien y a-t-il eu 
massacres des deux côtés ? 
Douste-Blazy : Cela n’est pas à moi de prendre parti. 
Mais il faut vraiment que la Commission des droits de 
l’homme des Nations unies, qui se réunit spécialement mardi, 




Once again, the Minister shows no hesitation in stating categorically 
that the events in Rwanda are a ‘vrai génocide’. However, this 
strong statement is immediately followed by an obvious reticence to 
confirm the identity of  the genocide perpetrators, or to contradict 
or clarify the notion of  massacres committed by both sides which 
is introduced by the interviewer’s question. The motivation for 
Douste-Blazy’s response appears to be above all to leave the listener 
with an impression of  France’s impartiality with regard to the 
conflict in Rwanda, while at the same time expressing justifiable 
concern – ‘C’est terrible’ – from a fundamental humanitarian 
perspective. However, the Minister’s interview can also be seen as a 
public statement which effectively sidesteps the issue of  who exactly 
are ‘les coupables’ responsible for carrying out the extermination. 
The French government that was in power in 1994 was a 
government of  ‘cohabitation’, with a socialist President François 
Mitterrand and a right-wing government under Prime Minister 
Edouard Balladur. Despite being nicknamed the “cohabitation de 
velours” because of  the generally smooth relations that predominated, 
there were nevertheless some instances of  friction and one-
upmanship. With regard to the genocide in Rwanda, for example, 
it was on Mitterrand’s initiative that the French Cabinet made the 
decision on 14 June to deploy Opération Turquoise, however Juppé 
disregarded the President’s request to not immediately communicate 
that decision and stole the President’s thunder by making a public 
announcement in both televised and printed media that France 
would intervene in Rwanda (Wallis, 2006, 122-123).
The French government’s motivation at this point is described 
in scathing terms by French historian Gérard Prunier, who published 
– firstly in English – one of  the earliest monographs on the genocide 
in Rwanda: “The idea looked good in the context of  internal French 
politics. […] In other words, Rwanda and its chopped-up babies 
now looked as if  they could give good political mileage in terms of  
public opinion ratings.” (1995, 282)  Alain Juppé’s article entitled 
‘Intervenir au Rwanda’ was published in the French newspaper 
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Libération on 16 June 1994. The principal purpose of  this article 
was clearly to ‘sell’ the idea of  France’s intervention in Rwanda 
to the French people, and the article details the extensive positive 
contributions to that country made by the French government in 
the recent past, particularly in relation to the pursuit of  a peaceful 
power-sharing agreement and the provision of  humanitarian aid. 
The term ‘génocide’ is used only twice, once towards the beginning 
of  the article and once towards to the end. The first occurrence 
mirrors the same progression of  ideas discussed above with regard 
to Juppé’s comments in the French parliament: “Il faut parler de 
génocide, car il y a bien volonté délibérée […] d’abattre les Tutsis 
[…]. Mais dans le même temps se livre une lutte sans merci pour le 
pouvoir” (para. 3). The evocation of  a ‘lutte sans merci’ placed in 
parallel with ‘génocide’ effectively weakens the force of  the latter 
term by immediately shifting the reader’s attention from the notion 
of  a crime against humanity to the notion of  armed conflict. In 
this connection, it is significant that in the body of  the article, the 
most recurrent concepts, which arguably would therefore have the 
greatest impact on the reader, relate to three key notions: that of  two 
opposing groups (six occurrences) e.g. “ceux qui dans chacun des 
camps rêvent de pouvoir gouverner seul” (para. 5); that of  the long-
standing ethnic differences/tensions (five occurrences) e.g. “Après 
des années de tensions ethniques” (para. 2); and that of  extensive 
killing on the ground constituting massacres (five occurrences) e.g. 
“Il n’est plus temps de déplorer les massacres les bras croisés” (para. 
11).  The accumulation of  these terms builds up an overall picture 
of  a violent conflict between two opposing ethnic groups. This also 
can be seen as preparing the ground for the manner in which the 
term ‘génocide’ is used for a second time towards the end of  the 
article:
La France n’aura aucune complaisance à l’égard des assassins. 
La France, seul pays occidental représenté au niveau 
ministériel à la session extraordinaire de la Commission des 
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droits de l’homme à Genève, exige que les responsables de 
ces génocides soient jugés. (para. 10).  [author’s highlighting] 
From a grammatical perspective, the accumulation of  plural nouns in 
this sentence reinforces the notion of  a multiplicity of  unidentified 
aggressors, rather than a clear distinction between genocide 
perpetrators and targeted victims.  Juppé’s use of  the term ‘génocide’ 
in the plural at the end of  this article constitutes a semantic shift that 
aligns it much more closely to the connotations of  a ‘massacre’, i.e. 
the indiscriminate slaughter of  many people. This rhetorical strategy 
is therefore significant because it uses ‘génocide’ in a way that would 
appear to minimise the core component of  ‘intent to destroy a 
particular group’ by reframing the events occurring in Rwanda as 
a particularly violent conflict, rather than a unidirectional campaign 
of  extermination. 
Alain Juppé’s article constitutes a very rich text which deserves 
more extensive analysis than can be afforded within the limits of  the 
present discussion. However, a feature of  Juppé’s language which is 
particularly noteworthy is how specific terms are chosen to convey 
not only their superficial meaning, but often – and more importantly 
- their implied meaning. For example, Juppé readily admits that 
France is guilty with regard to Rwanda because, like other countries 
in the international community, France can rightly be accused of  a 
“passivité coupable” (para 4). Thus, by implication, if  France has 
indeed been passive, this logically precludes it from having had any 
active involvement in the situation in Rwanda, as the two concepts 
are mutually exclusive. Similarly, with regard to his use of  the term 
‘génocide’ in this article and elsewhere, I would argue that Juppé 
was very much aware of  the broader implications associated with 
using this term, particularly with regard to how the person using it 
would be perceived by third parties. Mention has been made above 
of  how the moral implications with which the term was imbued 
provoked an extreme reticence on the part of  the UN and the USA 
to adopt it; this lead the latter to engage in bizarre lexical gymnastics, 
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with the US government only acknowledging “acts of  genocide” in 
Rwanda (Frontline). However, from Juppé’s perspective, these same 
connotations would constitute a compelling argument in their own 
right in defence of  France’s moral position with regard to Rwanda: 
in other words, how could France possibly be accused of  complicity, 
or indeed any involvement whatsoever in the genocide, when it was 
the first country which had the courage to explicitly use this highly 
significant term? This perspective is illustrated by a conversation 
between Alain Juppé and the French philosopher and public figure 
Bernard-Henri Lévy, which is documented in an article published in 
2011 by the human rights organisation Survie France:
Alain Juppé reprochant à Bernard-Henri Lévy, dans l’avion 
présidentiel de retour du voyage officiel en Libye : “Vous 
avez dit que j’étais complice des génocidaires du Rwanda. Alors que, 
sortant d’une réunion des ministres européens en 1994, j’avais déclaré 
que c’était un génocide ”. L’argument est court, très court pour sa 
défense. (Rwanda, 2011) 
In summary, Juppé’s use of  the term ‘génocide’ in both its singular 
and plural form can be seen as an example of  the deliberate 
manipulation of  language to further the interests of  the French 
government.  Firstly, it implicitly established France’s laudable moral 
position as one of  condemning the genocide that, at the time, it alone 
dared to name. Secondly, it subtly reconfigured the representation 
of  the events on the ground as a reciprocal exercise in mass killings, 
rather than as the clear implementation of  a genocidal agenda 
targeting the Tutsis. This was of  crucial importance for the French 
authorities, especially in the light of  the evidence of  the military and 
logistical support which they had provided to the successive Hutu 
governments in Rwanda before and during the genocide (Mission, 
1998, 184-5; Des Forges, 1999, 92-94); support which France was 
later to address in its Mission d’information under the euphemistic 
heading of  “des erreurs d’appréciation”. (1998, 11) 
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When the genocide began in Rwanda in April 1994, François 
Mitterrand had been president of  France for thirteen years; during 
his two terms in office he took a very close personal interest in 
France’s presence and influence on the African continent. In this 
connection, the appointment of  his son Jean-Christophe as head 
of  the African bureau was justifiably interpreted as a tokenistic 
appointment to facilitate the President’s own direct control of  
government policy; this led to Jean-Christophe being nicknamed 
‘Papamadit’ by African politicians, as he was so obviously his 
father’s mouthpiece. (Doray, 2002) In examining the language used 
by François Mitterrand in relation to Rwanda, this keenness to 
directly influence France’s official involvement in African matters 
would suggest that any comment made by the President, whether 
in a public or private context, is worthy of  note. In the summer of  
1994, Mitterrand made an informal remark in relation to Rwanda 
which was quoted at the beginning of  this article: “Dans ces 
pays-là un génocide, c’est pas trop important.” This was reported 
by the journalist Patrick de Saint-Exupéry in the national French 
newspaper Le Figaro on 12 January 1998, and has frequently been 
cited in studies criticising France’s involvement, even inspiring the 
title of  a monograph on this subject (Gouteux, 2001). The context 
in which this statement was made was that of  a private conversation 
with colleagues, therefore undoubtedly without the expectation that 
it would be disseminated in broader circles. Its relaxed conversational 
register and syntax enhance the impression of  a personal, unguarded 
comment. Its immediate impact is disturbing because it articulates 
a clear distinction between the value of  human life in ‘those 
countries’, as compared to developed nations. However, it is also 
significant from a lexical perspective, in that it constitutes a further 
example of  the banalisation of  the term ‘génocide’ by its syntactical 
juxtaposition with an offhand phrase “c’est pas trop important” that 
effectively detracts from its full semantic value. 
This was far from being an isolated and potentially misquoted 
statement: Mitterrand expressed very similar views on two other 
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occasions in 1994. At the Franco-German summit in Mulhouse on 
31 May, he commented to the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl: 
“On nous a accusé d’avoir soutenu le régime précédent. On a un 
récit unilatéral du massacre. La réalité est que tout le monde tue 
tout le monde.” (Morel, 2010, 724). The terminology used here is 
particularly striking, especially given its close chronological proximity 
to Juppé’s official acknowledgement of  ‘génocide’ in Rwanda on 15 
May. Mitterrand uses ‘massacre’ rather than ‘génocide’ and contrasts 
the subjectivity of  what he deems to be a ‘récit unilatéral’, the one-
sided story that has been told, with what he regards as the reality of  the 
situation. Significantly, the strategy used by Mitterrand in these three 
short sentences to defuse accusations of  complicity in genocide on 
the part of  the French government is to represent the situation in 
Rwanda as generalised massacres. From that perspective, supporting 
one side or another would therefore not carry any particular 
moral overtones, and could be sociopolitically justifiable from the 
perspective of  defending the interests of  la francophonie: “une 
victoire du FPR est contraire à l’intérêt de l’ensemble francophone” 
(Rwanda, 2012, 388).
The second example relates to another evocation of  the term 
‘génocide’, which was used during a speech delivered by Mitterrand 
at the 18th Franco-African summit in Biarritz in November 1994. 
The oral version of  the speech contained the term ‘génocide’ in 
the singular, but in the written version it appeared in the inhabitual 
plural form, ‘génocides’. Patrick de Saint-Exupéry questioned the 
discrepancy at a press conference in Biarritz, provoking a strong 
reaction from the President: “le génocide ou les génocides?! Dans 
ces pays-là on a toujours tué, les massacres ce n’est pas nouveau.” 
(Saint-Exupéry, 2004, 18-20). This recurrence of  the term in the 
plural echoes Alain Juppé’s use of  the plural in the Libération article 
discussed above, suggesting that this lexical variation may well have 
acquired the status of  standard terminology in French government 
circles. Once again, in this example, the use of  the plural appears as 
an effective strategy to dilute the original denotational value of  the 
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term ‘génocide’ to make it more synonymous with the notion of  
‘heavy conflict and extensive loss of  life’, thereby removing the key 
defining factor of  deliberate intent to exterminate a target group. 
In subsequent years, the longevity of  the plural form among 
French government officials is attested by a noteworthy example that 
occurred in 2003 in a radio interview given by the then Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Dominique de Villepin: “Prenons le cas du Rwanda 
où 80 % des Rwandais ont été amenés à élire leur chef  d’Etat. C’est 
la première élection, moins de dix ans après les terribles génocides 
qui ont frappé le Rwanda.” (Interview). These words provoked a 
strong reaction from Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, the same journalist 
who had questioned Mitterrand in Biarritz. In a monograph on 
France’s involvement in Rwanda published in the following year, 
he extensively criticised the Minister for perpetuating Mitterrand’s 
legacy with regard to Rwanda and for espousing “une logique de 
négation” (2004, 15). 
In the 21st century there has been a distinct shift with regard 
to how the term ‘génocide’ has been used by members of  the 
French government. After the breakdown of  diplomatic relations 
between France and Rwanda in 2006, the official visit to Rwanda 
by President Nicolas Sarkozy in 2010 constituted an important step 
towards reconciliation between the two countries. This was reflected 
in the language used by the French President during the joint press 
conference with the Rwandan President Paul Kagame, where 
‘génocide’ was once again used in its original singular form: “Nous 
souhaitons que les responsables du génocide soient retrouvés et 
soient punis. Est-ce qu’il y en a en France? C’est à la justice de le 
dire” (Conférence de presse, 2010). However, even though the use of  
the singular term appears less encumbered by an underlying agenda 
than the examples discussed earlier in this article, the fact that 
Sarkozy then asks the rhetorical question of  whether any genocide 
perpetrators are located in France, when there is absolutely no doubt 
as to the veracity of  that statement, creates the impression that the 
French government is still far from ready to fully acknowledge the 
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extent of  its involvement in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. 
As this article has briefly demonstrated in its examination of  
the use of  the term ‘génocide’ by key French government members 
during and following the events of  1994 in Rwanda, far from being 
a matter of  “little importance”, the genocide committed against the 
Tutsi has in fact had far-reaching repercussions, not least of  all for 
France, which some twenty years later is still being called to account 
in relation to its role in the genocide. The enduring relevance of  this 
issue has been further confirmed by the considerable interest shown 
in the recent release into the public domain of  hitherto classified 
documents on Rwanda from the French government archives 
(“L’Élysée”). The above discussion has given some indication of  
the complexity underpinning the lexical and syntactical choices in 
evocations of  the term ‘génocide’ with regard to the 1994 Tutsi 
genocide, particularly in cases where the usage adopted by the 
respective speakers appears more suggestive of  persuasion or 
manipulation rather than simple denotation. A more extensive 
study of  the language used by French government members would 
therefore make a significant contribution to the “transparency” 
recently advocated by President Hollande (“L’Élysée”), thereby 
laying important groundwork for an effective and enduring 
reconciliation between the two countries. 
University of  Technology Sydney
Works cited
Conférence de presse conjointe de MM. Nicolas Sarkozy et Paul Kagamé, 
25 février 2010, available at: http://discours.vie-publique.fr/
notices/107000527.html, accessed 12.07.15.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of  the Crime of  Genocide, 
1948, available at: http://www.oas.org/dil/1948_Convention_
on_the_Prevention_and_Punishment_of_the_Crime_of_
Genocide.pdf, accessed 10.07.15.
Des Forges, A., Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda (New 
166
Narelle Fletcher
York: Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of  
Human Rights Leagues, 1999).
Doray, B., “Bénéfices Secondaires. À propos du livre de Jean-
Christophe Mitterrand, Mémoire meurtrie”, available at: 
https://www.cairn.info/revue-mouvements-2002-3-page-74.
htm, accessed 12.07.15.
Doridant, R. and Lacoste, C.,  “Peut-on parler d’un négationnisme 
d’État ?”  in Génocide des Tutsi au Rwanda : un négationnisme français ? 
available at: https://www.cairn.info/revue-cites-2014-1-page-91.
htm, accessed 10.07.15.
Fairclough, N., Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research 
(London: Routledge, 2003). 
__, Language & Power 2nd edition. (Harlow Essex: Pearson Educational 
Ltd, 2001).
Frontline 100 Days of  Slaughter : A Chronology of  U.S./U.N. Actions, 
available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/evil/etc/slaughter.html accessed 09.07.15.
Gouteux, J-P., La nuit rwandaise : l’implication française dans le dernier 
génocide du siècle (Paris : Izuba / L’Esprit frappeur, 2005).  
__, Un génocide sans importance: la Françafrique au Rwanda  (Lyon : 
Editions Tahin Party, 2001).
Interview de Dominique de Villepin à RFI le 1er septembre 2003, available 
at: http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/033002908.html, 
accessed 13.07.15.
Juppé, A., “Intervenir au Rwanda”, Libération, 16 June 1994, available 
at: http://en.calameo.com/read/000006365c1710d286a43, 
accessed 10.07.15.
King, H., “Genocide and Nuremburg”, in R. Henham and P. Behrens 
(eds.), The Criminal Law of  Genocide: International, Comparative and 
Contextual Aspects  (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2007), 
29-35.
“L’Élysée déclassifie ses archives sur le génocide rwandais”, 
Le Monde, 07 April 2015, available at: http://www.lemonde.fr/
afrique/article/2015/04/07/l-elysee-declassifie-ses-archives-
167
      A genocide of  little importance
sur-le-genocide-rwandais_4611206_3212.html#, accessed 
13.07.15.
Mission d’information sur le Rwanda, 1998, available at: http://www.
assemblee-nationale.fr/dossiers/rwanda/r1271.asp, accessed 13. 
07.15.
Morel, J., La France au cœur du génocide des Tutsi (Paris: L’Esprit 
frappeur, 2010). 
Pradelle, G. de la, Imprescriptible: L’implication française dans le génocide 
tutsi portée devant les tribunaux (Paris: Editions des Arènes, 2005). 
Prunier G., The Rwanda Crisis : History of  a Genocide (London: Hurst 
& Company, 1995).
Rapport Mucyo, 2007, available at: http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/
images/104%5CRapport_Rwanda.pdf, accessed 13.07.15. 
Rwanda, boulet moral pour Juppé, 2011, available at: http://survie.
org/billets-d-afrique/2011/206-octobre-2011/article/rwanda-
boulet-moral-pour-juppe, accessed 13.07.15.
Rwanda: les archives secrètes de Mitterrand (1982-1995) (Paris: L’Esprit 
Frappeur, 2012). 
Saint-Exupéry, P. de, L’Inavouable : La France au Rwanda (Paris: 
Editions des Arènes, 2004).
Wallis, A., Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of  France’s Role in the 
Rwandan Genocide (London: IB Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2006).
186
Contributors
Peter Brown is Associate Professor of  French at the Australian National 
University where he served for several years as Head of  the School of  
Language Studies. He has written on 19th century French literature, 
especially Stéphane Mallarmé (Mallarmé et l’écriture en mode mineur). He has 
also explored the culture and literature of  the wider French-speaking 
world, in particular the Pacific. In 2015 he was a contributor to the book 
French Lives in Australia. A Collection of  Biographical Essays.  Peter Brown is a 
Fellow of  the Australian Academy for the Humanities.
Email: peter.brown@anu.edu.au
Chantal Crozet is a senior lecturer in French Studies and Intercultural 
Communication and a researcher in applied linguistics in the School of  
Global, Urban and Social Studies. Her research interests focus on the links 
between language, culture, identity and education. Her latest publications 
include: The Intercultural Foreign Language Teacher: Challenges and Choices; On 
Language and Interculturality: Teaching Languages and Cultures for a Global World; 
and First, Second, Third Place and Beyond: Reflection on a Philosophy of  Self  and 
Identity for Intercultural Language Teaching.
Email: chantal.crozet@rmit.edu.au
Narelle Fletcher is a Lecturer in French at the University of  Technology 
Sydney and is a member of  the Interdisciplinary Genocide Studies Centre 
in Kigali, Rwanda. She is also a professional French-English translator and 
has collaborated extensively with investigative journalists and legal firms 
providing translations in the areas of  human rights and development in 
Rwanda and the DRC. The primary focus of  her research is the terminology 
and syntactical structures used by Rwandans to talk about the genocide in 
the three languages used in Rwanda: Kinyarwanda, English and French. 
Email: Narelle.Fletcher@uts.edu.au
Françoise Grauby est Senior Lecturer à l’Université de Sydney. Ses articles 
les plus récents portent sur les ateliers d’écriture en France, les interviews 
d’écrivains et les processus créateurs dans leurs rapports avec la vocation 
littéraire: ‘Du mystère dans les lettres: Philippe Djian et Pierre Michon sur 
la ‘grâce’ et l’inspiration’, Nottingham French Studies (52.3 (2013): 296–307); 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.
